

# NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND SLAVERY THROUGH INDEBTEDNESS

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## Nuclear capability and slavery through indebtedness

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The Pakistani nation and its leadership are standing at the critical juncture and crossroad of history. Whatever decision is taken today will have far-reaching impact on the future of Pakistan and the Muslim Ummah it is no exaggeration to claim that their role in the 21st century depends mostly on this decision. The Prime Minister's visit to the United States and his meeting with President Bill Clinton on December 2, 1998, make important link of this whole process. It is exactly the moment of the history, which, "if wasted, will prove misleading for a century".

The real problem is not one of getting a fresh four or five billion dollars loan, or to restructure the old debt. The problem is also not of lifting or partially relaxing the economic and military sanctions. Similarly, the true problem is not to get the F-16s, or to recover the paid money, held up for the last 8 years. At best, these could be termed secondary aspects of the problem, which is the question of Pakistan's freedom and security and its strength and stability. The problem relates to Pakistan's ability and capability to play its role in building and shaping its future and that of the Muslim Ummah according to its own priorities set in the light of its own ideology, religion, and civilizational and political aspirations. The matter may relate to India or the U.S., the problem is what has summarily been stated.

What could be the reason, that India possessing three fourth area of the South-Asian sub-continent and holding reins over as much population, has not to date, accepted Pakistan as a sovereign Muslim country and is at war against the two-nation theory, whereas the Indian National Congress had accepted the Partition on the basis of the same, principle. Pakistan certainly, is to be blamed for its own weakness and mistakes that led to loss of East Pakistan, but as Indra Gandhi openly said, India raided Pakistan's eastern wing only to sink the two-nation theory, in the Bay of Bengal. The world response to this naked aggression was quite cool and passive. The same "justification" is forwarded by the Indians for occupation of Kashmir, insisting "we do not accept the two-nation theory". Every Indian leadership has been openly declaring: "We are in a state of war against Pakistan and China. For security against these two enemies, nuclear weaponization and all-time war preparations are essential". This was not only declared by the BJP Prime Minister and his Interior Minister, but in quite clear words, by the Indian Government's think tank and diplomat - Jaswant Singh. His article "Against Nuclear Apartheid" appearing in the U.S. journal Foreign Affairs (vol.77, No.5, Sep/Oct, 1998) is the most clear statement of the Indian nuclear doctrine.

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\* Adapted from "Tarjuiuan-ul-Quran", December, 1998.

There is need to understand the U.S. position too. Pakistan never spared anything to avail American friendship and favor. However, starting from the Indo-China war in 1962 to the nuclear explosions in May 1998, the U.S. attitude and the economic and military sanctions, make three things quite clear:

- One, for Pakistan, the U.S. is not at all trust-worthy.as friend. It never helped in need. It's promises and pacts of help and protection cannot be relied upon;
- Two, the real U.S. inclination is towards India. At every hour of trial, it upheld Indian interests against Pakistan. In its global political design, U.S. considers necessary the Indian regional hegemony. It would certainly like to see Pakistan living as a "young brother" of India, but is not ready to accept a position in which it is able to manage its affairs and play its specific role;
- Three, U.S. and rest of the West are nervous about the Islamic threat. That is why U.S. wants Pakistan to be weak enough to play any effective central role in unifying the world Muslims. For that purpose the Israeli dagger is thrust in the heart of the Arab world and that state has been strengthened so much that it should dominate the combined Arab states militarily and economically, and that no challenging power should emerge. In Turkey, the Muslim elements are so controlled that the country, in alliance with Israel, can act upon the secular agenda. Any nation that aspires for free will — be it Iran, Libya, Iraq or anyone — is so pressed that it is no more able to change the course. After having achieved independence a situation is created in the Central Asian states that they may not join Pakistan, Iran and Turkey to create a Muslim block, and this whole area remains linked with Russia and Europe. In this context, Pakistan becoming a nuclear capable power is most awesome for the West and a factor that can upset their whole future plan.

In the light of this historical evidence, it can be well-understood that in the sight of U.S., Israel and the European countries, the real danger is Pakistan's nuclear capability and economic progress and emancipation. The Indian nuclear status conforms with this design. That is why when China acquired atomic power in 1964, work was initiated on making India a nuclear power. Prominent role was played in the process by U.S., Israel, Canada, France and USSR. No reaction was given against Indian detonation in 1974. Situation was created and facilitated for the Indian explosions of 1998 and no action was taken against her until Pakistan conducted tests on May 28. The whole rage and offense is targeted at Pakistan's nuclear capability and that how it could be contained. The weapon of economic sanctions is applied exactly for the same end. These sanctions were not enforced

in June, 1998; the process rather continues since 1976 in various forms and intensities.

The relaxation now being promised is not intended to pull Pakistan out of the crisis. It is to fulfill the needs of their own agricultural and industrial lobbies. Another purpose is that Pakistan is kept in a condition of reliance upon the U.S. and Europe. That its economy should sustain in a state of incubation and given that much "oxygen" that the "sickman" remains just alive and keeps on asking for more oxygen.

Thus the true issue is not one of signing the CTBT, nor to make some arrangements for temporary bail out from the clutches of World Bank, IMF and other international money-lenders. The issue is rather to establish the exact position of the country in the light of the vision that was the driving force in the creation of Pakistan. Then according to that vision the security and solidarity of the country is to be arranged.

Let it be clearly understood that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not something permanent and self-contained independent matter. It, in fact, is a key element of a comprehensive and integrated world nuclear doctrine. If someone contends that by signing CTBT the matter will be over, then this stupidity and short-sightedness is beyond comprehension. The true purpose of the Treaty is that the five world atomic powers, and more particularly the United States, should have sustained and unchallenged upper, hand. And, that the Muslim world stays permanently deprived of this capability. ^The U.S. nuclear umbrella provides protecting shield to the two American continents, Europe and Japan. The Russian umbrella, inspite of all its weaknesses, covers half the Europe and Asia. China is capable to protect itself. In Europe, UK and France have their own arrangements. Now India has managed to secure the power that can establish her hegemony over the region. The nuclear doctrine followed by India is to be ready by the year 2030 to face China and to extend and impose its security system over Asia.

The only area that does not have this nuclear security system, is the Muslim world stretching from Morocco to Malaysia, and is dependent on others for its defence. Worst is the condition of the Arabs, who inspite of enormous wealth at command, figure nowhere by way of either conventional weapons or nuclear capability. Their freedom and security depends on a 'thread', which the U.S. and Israel can sever any moment. Under the circumstances the future of the Muslim world depends on Pakistan. That is exactly why the whole political, economic and moral pressure is exerted against it and is being tamed using both carrot and stick.

After Pakistan conducted the Tests, the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5), the eight industrially developed nations (G-8) and the UN Security

Council through its resolution, have all made it sufficiently clear that after the Tests ban, the following steps will be necessary:

1. Participation in the NPT;
2. Banning enrichment, signing the concerned pact and stay committed to follow the inspection system;
3. Accept the treaty banning the missile technology, restriction of the (delivery system and inspection);
4. Restrain from weaponization, miniaturization and deployment of nuclear material; and
5. To bring under a Command and Control System, whatever capability exists.

As understood by U.S. and other Western powers, the above said five requirements are components of one non-divisible nuclear doctrine. To date Pakistan is totally out of this whole system, and in spite of all hue and cry at the international level, all its steps were legally and morally correct, and Pakistan had every right to do that. No international pact was violated so far. But once Pakistan signs and becomes part of the system, then it will be bound to follow all rules and never able to get rid of it. A country once entrapped, if thinks of freedom, will face the fate of Iraq and the type of threats given to North Korea.

CTBT in this trap is the first step, which Pakistan must avoid if it wishes to be saved of the rest. That step taken will surely lead Pakistan to accept the whole by hook or by crook and may be chokingly. This is not some baseless thinking and hallucination. The P-5 foreign ministers made a declaration in Geneva on June 4, 1995. Its Articles (3) and (4) clearly state (English rendition ours):

"The five powers have pledged that no matter what steps taken and cost incurred, Pakistan and India will be obliged to ratify CTBT unconditionally, accept FMCT, stop installing missiles or proliferating nuclear equipment and technology ....(Article 3).

The five further promised that: "We shall get immediate signature of Pakistan and India on NPT. That no amendment will be made in the NPT for the sake of the two countries (meaning no recognition as nuclear power)...(Article 4) (1673/1998)".

In the light of this memorandum, the UN Security Council approved its Resolution 1172 that contains 17 articles. Articles 10 to 13 clearly state: Pakistan and India should immediately stop nuclear weapons development. Both should ensure that they will not set up missiles that can deliver nuclear weapons to their targets, not to prepare nuclear material, ban nuclear proliferation and not to further develop and expand the technology. That full pressure be exerted on the two countries to sign CTBT and NPT, unconditionally and without delay.

On June 8, 1998, G-8 reiterated the same demands^ When the Prime Minister of Pakistan pledged on September 23, 1998 in the UN General Assembly to respect CTBT and accept it practically - date unspecified - the U.S. Secretary of State Albright clarified right on the next day that CTBT was not the only issue; the whole nuclear regime is to be accepted and adhered to. The U.S. Security Adviser, Sunday Berger repeated the same.

U.S. Under Secretary of State, Strat Talbot, speaking on "Peace and Security in South Asia" in the World Network Programme (November 13, 1998) made his view point. He openly stated that total nuclear roll-back was the real target. With respect to CTBT, it was clarified for the first time that it does not mean only inspecting the testing sites, but to open all nuclear sites for inspection, Remember, the Treaty mentions only the terms 'tests' and 'explosions'. As these terms were not properly defined in the Treaty, Mr. Talbot's confession has brought the cat out of the bag. And look! the Pakistani politicians and scientists rely upon the words and letters, and promise the nation that: Nuclear sites can (will) not be inspected (see "U.S. and South Asian Nuclear Dynamics", editorial.. The Muslim, 16 November, 1998).

The matter that CTBT is the title and component of an integrated indivisible whole nuclear system, is based on facts hard to deny. The decision to be taken today is whether Pakistan is ready to be entangled in the system, and resultantly get its limbs cut. Of; it is willing to pay any price to stay free, to insist on and maintain its nuclear capability for the sake of its honour, and to be empowered at strengthening and developing it according to the national needs. If freedom and security are dear to Pakistan, then it will have to decide today that subservience to the Imperialist system will not be accepted at any cost and against any incentive. That Pakistan will look only to Allah, place confidence in its people and follow the path of self-reliance. If for some uncertain and false promises, and for any expediency, the nation is subjected to this new slavery, the deliverance will be real hard.

To suggest not to sign CTBT, our strong and irrefutable argument is one, that it is a component of an integrated system. If Pakistan could not avoid this first step, it will •certainly get enslaved in the total programme, no matter what attempts it

makes to get spared. Finally, the nuclear capability will have to be frozen, restricted, reduced and abandoned. If Pakistan does not want that end result, it has to show the courage, resolve and self-confidence, and be ready to pay the price. To think and say that: "We will sign and still save our nuclear programme", is sheer self-deception.

Pakistan's security concerns are multi-faceted. And all these aspects — military security, economic security, ideological security or civilizational security — are equally important and inter-related. No doubt the first on the list is the military concern. Giving an opening way through that door means inviting all dangers, rather committing national suicide. This specific aspect of the national security relates to the threat perception from India, as well as Pakistan's role in shaping the future of the Muslim Ummah. Both these dimensions should remain in sight side by side. In this background, Pakistan's nuclear power and its progress and consolidation in future become extraordinarily important. If this dual task is to be accomplished, then accepting ban on further nuclear tests is a criminal treachery, impossible to compensate or be pardoned.

A lobby is promising that Pakistan can maintain its deterrent capability even without further testing. Some respectable nuclear scientists have also joined this group. Without the least contempt and disdain for anybody's opinion, the political and scientific leadership is requested to look at the issue with open mind and should not let themselves be overtaken by some optimism or misconception.

Pakistan is in the initial stage of nuclear development. Thanks God, it has acquired the basic capability and has expressed it successfully. Allah be praised and all individuals and institutions certainly deserve that for performing this valuable task, their services be duly acknowledged by the nation with thanks. Yet, the irrefutable historic fact should never be overlooked that, while entering into the military build-up, competition is a costly deal and, therefore, should never be resorted to for mere sense of pride. Yet a countering strength and a minimum credible deterrent are essential for national security. Might and deterrence is not a static perception; it is rather dynamic. The adversary's capacity - to attack and defend - is to be kept in view and then decide one's own limits. If even Pakistan overlooks the Israeli danger (and we do not consider it wise), even then the Indian danger is a naked fact. India has very clearly declared its nuclear ambitions that it is a nuclear weaponized country, and this status is never to be changed. Jaswant Singh clarifies various aspects of this new paradigm in "Foreign Affairs" (Sept-Oct, 1998, pp. 46-51):

- "Today India is a nuclear weapon state" (p.46)

- "India made its nuclear decisions guided only by its national interest, always supported by a national consensus" (p.46)
- "India has moved from being moralistic to being a little more realistic, while the rest of the nuclear world has arrived at all its nuclear conclusions' entirely realistically" (p.47)
- "India is the only country in the world sandwiched between two nuclear weapon powers" (p.48)
- "India, in exercise of its supreme national interests, has acted in a timely fashion to correct an imbalance and fill a dangerous vacuum. A more powerful India will help balance and connect the oil-rich Gulf region and the rapidly industrializing countries of Southeast Asia" (p.48)
- "India has brought into open the nuclear reality that had remained clandestine for at least past 11 years" (p.49)
- "India's motives remain security, ... the tests encompassed the range of technologies necessary to make a credible deterrent" (p.49)
- India's nuclear policy has been marked by restraint and openness...Restraint, however, has to arise from strength. Restraint is valid only when it removes doubts, which is precisely what India's tests did - the minimum necessary to maintain an irreducible component of country's national security calculus" (P-51)
- "What India did in May was to assert that it is impossible to have two standards of national security - one based on nuclear deterrence and the other outside it... India still lives in a rough neighbourhood. It would be a great error to assume that simply advocating the new matters of globalization and the market makes national security subservient to global trade. The 21st Century will not be the century of trade. The world still has to address the unfinished agenda of the centuries" (p. 52)

The Indian leadership has made it clear that:

India is state equipped with nuclear weapons. It will maintain and develop this capability at all costs, so that it has the supremacy beyond its borders and extending up to Gulf;

1. For the time being, India needs no more testing, but if need be, the options are open and no limitations will be accepted;
2. For the time being, India needs no more testing, but if need be, the options are open and no limitations will be accepted;



3. Minimum deterrence does not mean mere capability, but it means proper weapons and an effective delivery system.

Jasit Singh, Director of Indian Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis states clearly:

"recessed deterrence may be defined as a credible nuclear weapons capability which the country is able to draw upon for political and diplomatic purposes, and is able to deploy a nuclear arsenal within a defined time-frame and effectively use it physically for military purposes" (The News, Nov. 15, 1998, p.7)

Premier Atal Bihari Vajpai, in his statement in the Indian Parliament, said the same. According to him, minimum deterrence is practically "the minimum capability to fight a nuclear war".

Another Indian military strategist says:

"The nuclear deterrence must be able to weaponise, deploy and deliver a second strike within 24 hours or so, inflicting unacceptable damage".

In the above ideological and theoretical frame, one may make addition that:

- India possesses at present 80 to 100 bombs in ready form;
- Has material to prepare 20 more bombs and a delivery system
- Has prepared weapons based both on Uranium and Plutonium;
- Claims that it has also conducted thermo-nuclear test, which leads to preparing Hydrogen bomb, hundred times more destructive;
- Has enough Plutonium (Pu239) and also Tritonium which works as instant booster in the thermonuclear (H3) device Hydrogen Isotope;
- Because of the great land mass, India has the strategic depth, yet obtained nuclear sub-marine from Russia and is busy fabricating one Thus it has the 'second-strike' capability

To contain such an adversary, it is necessary for Pakistan to possess not equal but competitive capability. From this view-point Pakistan does not have enough in store. The tests that Pakistan carried out are inadequate inspite of all their

success and effectiveness. To maintain sufficient countering strength and to meet the requirements of new technology, options of further nuclear tests must be open.

After having properly consulted scientists in and outside Pakistan, the writer dares to suggest that while there is no need for further testing to confirm the weapon-grade level of Uranium ( $U^{235}$ ) enrichment, but for assessing Plutonium ( $Pu^{239}$ ) the testing process is essential. Computer simulation or cold testing does not provide reliable results. Thermo-nuclear device needs hot testing. Hot-tests are also necessary for weaponization; miniaturization in a way that creates minimum radiation and least hazards for human life and health; and, to assure that the target is hit with precision. Kahuta may not be needing hot testing soon, but for Khushab such tests are essential in the coming stages. Similarly tests have great importance in the preparation of "tactical low yield" devices. Pakistan needs to obtain Tritium. The enemy is far ahead in this respect.

Under the circumstances those who suggest that the country can face all the future nuclear challenges without ensuring to contain enemy's capabilities based on Pakistan's present nuclear capacity, have no scientific reason to offer. No doubt the nation must first rely upon Allah's grace. However, remember that the Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) while ordering Muslims to have trust in Allah, also advised to "keep the camel tied". This implies that Pakistan should not tie its own hands unless India is properly bound to make solemn pledge and agree to a practical solution of the issue of Kashmir.

In principle computer simulation is correct. But where are those super computers; and the dual purpose technology, of which U.S. and the Western powers have to date kept Pakistan deprived. India possesses these super computers; has acquired the relevant advanced technology and is getting more. Pakistan in this respect is far behind. Because of the level of nuclear capability that was owned by Russia and particularly the U.S., and then having the data of a thousand hot tests each, can update their nuclear capability even without such further testing's. CTBT certainly provides for cold-testing, but unless Pakistan avails necessary technology, how can it develop competitive capacity without practical testing. To have that simulation capability and for further developing it according to needs, Pakistan has to acquire software and data set for the following processes:

- I. Super computers;
- II. Non-nuclear testing equipment of zero yield;
- III. Fast data acquisition system;
- IV. Linear Escalators;

## V. High Energy flash x-ray simulations.

The West has established monopoly over the new technology. The doors have been kept shut and only false promises of transfer of technology made to keep Pakistan guessing. Even scientists and students for advanced studies are barred from their universities and laboratories. Let them first open all these areas. Without that the cruel and oppressive nuclear apartheid has only divided the humanity into two permanent and distinct groups: the nuclear power holding dominant nations; and, the nuclear have-nots vassal states. Will Pakistan and the Muslim Ummah accept this position of mean subservience?' Does this position have any relevance to the Muslim's faith, of their being "best of the nations" (*khair-ci-Ummah*), and their standing "Witnesses upon the humanity" (*shuhada 'alan' Nas*)?

To the intellectuals who advise that signing CTBT will have no effect on Pakistan's nuclear capability, it is submitted with respect, that Pakistan is to face India which has many times more power both in conventional and nuclear fields, where Pakistan has been able only to create minimum deterrence. Its position has improved somewhat after the May 28 tests and the chances of a war have minimized to that extent. So, to maintain this capacity in future and to up-grade it to the required level(s), is necessary. However, these Pakistani intellectuals feel that the said minimum capability is also not worth-maintaining or not required. On the other hand see not India, but the U.S. — the only world super power — which possesses many times more capacity in conventional and nuclear weapons against both Russia and China, has undertaken 1045 hot-tests, and inspite of signing CTBT has made four tests last year within the "sub-critical" limits and keeps the right for more such tests and computer simulation — . Well, a prominent group of top U.S. nuclear scientists has advised its government NOT to ratify CTBT. The group claims that no matter how supreme the present U.S. position may be, it should not accept any ban on hot-tests if it wishes to keep its upper hand and world position in future.

The U.S. President has certainly signed the Treaty, but the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, has not even initiated considering it. The Committee's chairman has already opposed the Treaty. The Senate Committee is (only lingering the matter by) continuing to consider it. The appearance and testimony before the Committee of the following three prominent heads of institutions, is real eye-opener:

- a) John Holum, Director Arms Control and Disarmament Agency;
- b) Spurgeon Keeny, head of the Arms Control Association;
- c) Dr Kathleen Baily, head of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

A few extracts are reproduced here for the consideration of the intellectuals and the leadership:

"Without the ability to conduct nuclear explosive tests, nuclear weapon states will be effectively frozen at current level of weapon development. (Senate Hearing on CTBT, March 18, 1998).

"The United States is currently in a position to reap maximum benefits from such a freeze"

"Indeed CTBT will strengthen our means to monitor nuclear testing world-wide. It will improve our nuclear test monitoring capabilities. The CTBT augments the current national technical means for monitoring nuclear testing with additional tools and data not previously available to the United States"

"The CTBT will allow us to monitor a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent. The first safeguard mandated the control of a stockpile stewardship programme to ensure high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile....confirming that the U.S. will enter the CTBT regime with a power, well tested arsenal"

Thus Dr Holum views that U.S. does not need more tests. It should rather entangle rest of the world in such a manner that its permanent supremacy is never challenged:

"What it needs is more American leadership for another tool we can use to rein in the nuclear danger"

The countries not having stockpile of nuclear arms will not be able to make arms high quality without carrying out any test. Dr Holum in this regards says:

"It is possible to develop a simple fission device without testing and certainly that could be done. At the same time, the ability to conduct a boosted or to develop a boosted weapon that would have + could be reduced in size and delivered in the ways I described would be much harder. I think the experts would say without testing that would very likely be an impossible test. Similarly, the ability to design a two-stage device, as thermo-nuclear device, would be a challenge beyond the reach of countries without testing".

About the computer tests, Dr Holum says that China and Russia have million theoretical operation per second (or) mamtox (ph), whereas the United States

possesses computers of the capacity of 100,000 mamtox (ph), which is part of the stockpile stewardship programme.

In spite of this capability and readiness for future demands, Dr Kathleen Baily strongly recommends that US should not ratify CTBT, because it will constrain it to maintain its upper hand in future or ensure its total security needs:

"Let me start with my conclusion, which is that CTBT fails the cost benefit test. Specifically it will not accomplish the non-proliferation goals as set out for it by the administration. And at the same time, the treaty will seriously degrade the US nuclear deterrent, and this will have a high national security cost". (Senate Sub- Committee Hearing on CTBT, Testimony III by Dr Baily, 18/3/98). "CTBT does constitute a step toward disarmament. This is because nuclear weapons states are not by any means abandoning nuclear deterrents, but are instead taking steps to assure that their stockpiles will remain safe and reliable, and therefore usable, despite the test ban. The U.S. stockpile stewardship programme is designed to defeat nuclear erosion. It is the dependence of the nuclear weapon states on nuclear deterrent despite the NPT commitments to disarmament that is the source of greatest damages to the Non-Proliferation Treaty."

Dr Kathleen also informs that test of less than kiloton yield cannot possibly be monitored under this Treaty, so the tests will continue. Also, by resorting to what is called "de-complying process", the yield of a device can be lowered to one-seventieth. That is to say 10 kiloton experiment will show only 0.14 kiloton. This is the technology 'game' and will enable US to continue testing. Using this technique, the US practically conducted test on December 3, 1996 at Salt Domm.

Dr Kathleen opines that US should not ratify the Treaty, why because:

"Ratifying the CTBT will foreclose the ability of the United States to modernize its nuclear forces"

Agreeing what a computer can do, Dr Kathleen observes:

"virtual reality cannot replace reality"

Referring to future dangers, Dr Kathleen advises:

"We need to maintain the flexibility to have nuclear weapons designs. There may be new threats, for example, chemical and biological. What if we need to have a nuclear weapon that would detonate and burn up the biological agent in a particular bunker? We cannot do that conventionally,

we can do it nuclear. What if we needed a small tailor-made nuclear weapon to do that? We may discover new safety measures; we would need to do new designs then. Additionally, new technologies by Russia and China in terms of defending against our nuclear arsenal, our nuclear deterrent, could cause us to have to re-tailor our arsenal. We need to maintain flexibility to do that... I think we will continue to need some level of nuclear testing, not only to, if we chose to support stockpile stewardships, we need to be able to calibrate the stockpile stewardship"

This is what the scientists have to advise U.S., which possesses a nuclear weapons heap sufficient to destroy the whole globe 15 to 20 times. Here Pakistanis know very well what the Indian designs are, yet they feel complacent they are "well-prepared" for any future eventuality. Look, O wisemen! For God sake!!!

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Economic security is also necessary along with defence security — both are inter-related and inter-dependent. Having impartially looked at and analysed the current economic situation in Pakistan, our conclusion is that the real cause is not the sanctions imposed after the May 98 detonations. Cause is to be found in the ill-conceived economic policies that have arrested the progress, which fell behind what is maintained by the developing regional economies. Indebtedness is on the increase. The productivity of loans and investments is continuously decreasing. Inflation is rampant. Unemployment is growing, so is the black economy. Banks repayment rate is so unsatisfactory that default is close to 40 percent of the advances. This situation is prevailing as a clear pattern [since at least last 15 years. Therefore, putting all blame on the 'sanctions', running full gallop on the fatal path of seeking more and more loans, is economically disastrous and loaded with great dangers for national security. We shall (insha'allah) take up the issue of economic crisis and the way out separately and sometime soon. What, at this stage we wish to stress with full force and emphasis is: While formulating national security policy, the defence and economic security requirements should be delinked from the issue of seeking more loans from the World Bank and the IMF, and also to be dissociated from the question of economic and military sanctions.

Pakistan initiated its nuclear programme knowing well that sanction will come. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto went ahead with it even having received open threats from Henry Kissinger. General Ziaul Haq brushed aside sanctions imposed by President Jimmy Carter and continued with the programme. Ghulam Ishaq Khan faced all the pressures but did not budge an inch. The army, the scientists and the patriotic political forces stood firm to save the programme. It was the grace of Allah that

Pakistan was bestowed with becoming the first ever Muslim nuclear state. Now to stop or roll-back this programme at the price of lifting the sanctions will be a great historic crime, not to be tolerated by the nation.

Let us repeat. The real purpose is not to press Pakistan to sign CTBT. The intention is that the nuclear programme is gradually wound up and the global role of Pakistan is hurt and diminished. Granted that the country is hard hit economically, but the pressure should not result in submission at the nuclear front, because that will be suicidal. We believe that if structural reforms are not introduced in the economic strategy, then lifting of sanctions and securing more loans will make no real difference. Rather Pakistan will be deeply submerged in this guagmire. Presently, Pakistan is begging for 4 to 5 billion dollars: Next year the requirement will be 6 to 7 billions, and third year it may reach 10 billions. The external indebtedness that all put together makes 45 to 50 billion dollars will bring the bad tidings of 60 to 70 billion dollars. National freedom, security and honour will perish to naught.

We, therefore, warn the Government to be watchful in respect to Prime Minister's meeting with President Clinton and not to be carried away by the talisman of current pleasant mood of World Bank and the IMF. Stay careful of the deceptive trap and follow the way that ensures freedom, honour and national security. The nation is aggrieved that its leadership talks very loud and valorous when addressing its own people, but while it meets the Americans, it falls for them and cries for mercy, that it wants to do what Uncle Sam wants, but that the 'fundamentalists' would not let it.

Let this duplicity and hypocrisy finish. The policy should fully reflect what the nation aspires and demands. There is no justification to be willful and head-strong in the name of 'big mandate'. The mandate, whatsoever, has to remain within the framework of the promises made at the time of elections. Those promises were about enhancing the nuclear and defence strength and about never to accept or bow down before any pressure. Not only in the election speeches, but pledging in the manifesto, Muslim League clearly said (translation our's):

"Pakistan stands isolated at the international level. Past presents no parallel to the damages faced today by the national security and ideological identity. Pakistan Muslim League, being the country's founding party will formulate a foreign policy that will reflect national aspirations and will be characterised by strong defence, dynamic economy and popular confidence...

Muslim League will accord top priority to enhance the defence capabilities of the Pak army, so that Pakistan's regional security is

strengthened, and an effective role played in creating and supporting a sense of protection and peace... Muslim League believes in nuclear programme for peaceful purposes, and totally rejects any reduction in the country's nuclear capability or some biased and one-sided ban." (Muslim League Manifesto, 1997).

Peoples Party also promised in the election manifesto (1997):

"Will continue acquiring new weapons for immediate needs. Equip the army with most modern weapons. Will not sign NPT. Nuclear technology will be for peaceful purposes."

All political parties pledged in every election after 1985 not to compromise on the nuclear issue, and that is the true national mandate.

The present government brought CTBT in the joint session of the Parliament. What emerged from the debate was that the nation does not favour any agreement on CTBT. In this background, the Prime Minister has only one option. He should clearly tell that there will be no talk on the nuclear issue. The economic sanctions are unjustified and ways and means could be discussed for lifting the ban, but all this will be without any reference to or agreement upon nuclear capability. CTBT and other related treaties cannot be considered without first fully meeting Pakistan's security requirements and giving due regard to the interests of Muslim Ummah. The frame-work, within which talks could be held, is:

1. Permanent monopoly of a few countries over the nuclear capability is not acceptable: Either everyone should have it or none allowed. If the big powers insist to maintain this monopoly sheerly at the strength of their muscles, then reaction is a must, and that is what is happening. Pakistan will never agree to this apartheid and in this respect create awareness among the Ummah also;
2. The case of nuclear capability should immediately be de-linked with economic sanctions. Talks can be held on free economic cooperation, trade and investment. But no quid pro quo respecting nuclear capability or accepting CTBT, NPT, FMCT (fissile material cut off treaty) or MTCR (missile technology control regime);
3. Like India, Pakistan is "nuclear weapon state" (NWS), and the world has to accept this fact. Unless NPT is suitably amended (extend the 1967 cut-off date), the dialogue will not move an inch. Pakistan will never accept the position of non- NWS.



4. Whether at the international or regional level, Pakistan is ready to talk about nuclear disarmament and to establish a new healthy system. But all have to work for it;
5. An essential pre-requisite of (4) above is that solution to the problems of South Asia should be based on the Indian intentions and capacity and upon the acceptable balance of power between Pakistan and India. No special treatment be given to India anymore. The privileges available to her should also be accessible to the second nuclear power i.e. Pakistan. This includes permanent seat at the UN Security Council, transfer of technology and all other concessions and arrangements. Similarly, matters could be discussed with India relating to material enrichment; nuclear tests; missiles, nuclear weapons and their installation; and a reasonable deterrent strength in all these areas. But no one-way sanctions are accepted. In all these matters clear 'linkage' with India is natural and never to be compromised. If India ever goes for new test(s), or upsets the balance of power, then Pakistan should also be allowed to correct that balance. The only 'de-linking' possible is, that if India signs all treaties, but the most basic issue between Pakistan and India — deciding the future of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with UN resolutions — remains unsolved, then Pakistan should not accept any restriction under the said nuclear arrangement, even in the presence of Indian signatures;
6. In the light of (5) above, a decisive and important component of the framework is the just solution of Kashmir problem, which should be according to the UN resolutions and free will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Other issues are also important, but Kashmir provides key for the rest. The fifty years useless talks indicate that holding bi-lateral talks will not be sufficient. The necessity is also evident from the current latest talks held in New Delhi. The world powers and UN have to become active and the Kashmir freedom movement has to be given a status similar to other such movements. Kashmiris have to be given participation in these talks and the problem solved within a given time frame. Without this neither the regional peace is possible, nor the south Asian material and human development can be realised. If the ground realities

and demands of justice are overlooked, true peace will never materialise.

This is the six-point agenda which promises solution to; the South Asian problems. Talks could be held with U.S. and India and with the support of the Pakistani nation strategy can be worked out for regional reconstruction, but within the suggested frame work. Neither any other way is acceptable to the nation, nor will any headway be possible otherwise. Do meet President Clinton, Mr. Prime Minister! But take a strong stand with due courage and wisdom and not to budge an inch from it that serves the best security interests of the Pakistani nation and the Muslim Ummah. Get rid of the slavery of loans; yes, break the beggar's bowl seriously and for good and protect the nuclear capability at all cost for the sake of national freedom and security. This is the only path of life and honour. If this path is abandoned and weakness shown, then the nation, which has a high sense of honour, will not tolerate it. The US should also understand that any treaty thrust against the wishes and resolve of the nation will carry no weight and little respect.

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